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This paper studies the market price of credit risk incorporated into one of the most important
credit spreads in the financial markets: interest rate swap spreads. Our approach consists of jointly
modeling the swap and Treasury term structures using a general five-factor affine credit framework and
estimating the parameters by maximum likelihood. We solve for the implied special financing rate for
Treasury bonds and find that the liquidity component of on-the-run bond prices can be significant. We
also find that credit premia in swap spreads are positive on average. These premia, however, vary
significantly over time and were actually negative for much of the 1990s.
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One of the most fundamental issues in ﬁnance is how the market compensates investors
for bearing credit risk. Events such the ﬂight to quality that led to the hedge fund
crisis of 1998 demonstrate that changes in the willingness to bear credit risk can have
dramatic eﬀects on the ﬁnancial markets. Furthermore, these events indicate that
v a r i a t i o ni nc r e d i ts p r e a d sm a yr e ﬂe c tb o t hc h a n g e si np e r c e i v e dd e f a u l tr i s ka n di n
the relative liquidity of bonds. Understanding the risk and return tradeoﬀs for these
types of securities may become even more important in the future if the supply of U.S.
Treasury securities available in the market decreases.
This paper studies the market price of credit risk incorporated into what is rapidly
becoming one of the most important credit spreads in the ﬁnancial markets: interest
rate swap spreads. Since swap spreads represent the diﬀerence between swap rates
and Treasury bond yields, they reﬂect the diﬀerence in the default risk of the ﬁnancial
sector quoting Libor rates and the U.S. Treasury. In addition, swap spreads may
include a signiﬁcant liquidity component if the relevant Treasury bond trades special
in the repo market. Thus, swap spreads represent an important data set for examining
how both default and liquidity risks inﬂuence security returns. The importance of swap
spreads derives from the dramatic recent growth in the notional amount of interest
rate swaps outstanding relative to the size of the Treasury bond market. For example,
the total amount of Treasury debt outstanding at the end of June 2001 was $5.7
trillion. In contrast, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) estimates that the
t o t a ln o t i o n a la m o u n to fi n t e r e s tr a t es w a ps outstanding at the end of June 2001 was
$57.2 trillion, representing ten times the amount of Treasury debt.
Since swap spreads are fundamentally credit spreads, our approach consists of
jointly modeling the interest rate swap and Treasury term structures using the reduced-
form credit framework of Duﬃe and Singleton (1997, 1999). To capture the rich dy-
namics of the swap and Treasury curves, we use a ﬁve-factor aﬃne term structure
model which allows the swap spread to be correlated with the riskless rate. In ad-
dition, our speciﬁcation allows market prices of risk to vary over time to reﬂect the
possibility that the willingness of investors to bear credit and liquidity risk may change.
We estimate the parameters of the model by maximum likelihood. The data for the
study spans nearly the full history of the swap market. We show that both the swap
and Treasury term structures are well described by the ﬁve-factor aﬃne model.
A number of interesting results emerge from this analysis. First, we solve for the
short-term riskless rate implied by Treasury bond prices. We ﬁnd that the implied
riskless rate can diﬀer substantially from the Treasury-bill rate and is often much
higher. This is consistent with the widespread view on Wall Street that because of
1the extreme liquidity of Treasury bills, their yields tend to underestimate the eﬀective
riskless rate. Since the implied short-term riskless rate could also be interpreted as
special repo rate for the on-the-run Treasury bonds in the sample, we contrast them
with repo rates for generic or general Treasury collateral.1 We ﬁnd that these implied
special repo rates are slightly less than the general repo rates on average, suggesting
that the prices of the on-the-run Treasury bonds in the sample include premia for their
liquidity or specialness relative to oﬀ-the-run Treasury securities. These specialness
premia can be large in economic terms. For example, the specialness premium for the
ten-year Treasury note can be as much as 0.57 percent of its notional amount. The
estimated specialness premia match closely those implied by a sample of market term
special repo rates provided to us.
We then solve for the implied spread process. We ﬁnd that this spread varies
signiﬁcantly over time, but is nearly zero for an extended period during the mid to
latter 1990s. Interestingly, much of the variation in the implied credit spread is related
to the diﬀerence between the general and implied special repo rates, suggesting that
changes in the liquidity of Treasury bonds may be one of the major driving factors of
swap spreads.
Finally, we examine the implications of the model for the market prices of interest-
rate and credit-related risk. Consistent with previous research, we ﬁnd that there are
signiﬁcant time-varying term premia embedded in Treasury bond prices. We also ﬁnd
that there are signiﬁcant credit premia embedded in the swap curve. On average,
these premia are positive, ranging from 0.1 basis points for a one-year horizon to 45
basis points for a ten-year horizon. These credit premia also display substantial time
variation. Surprisingly, we ﬁnd evidence that credit premia were often negative during
an extended period in the 1990s. These results suggest that there have been major
changes over time in the expected returns from bearing the default and liquidity risk
inherent in interest rate swaps.
This paper complements and extends the recent paper by Duﬃe and Singleton
(1997) who apply a reduced-form credit modeling approach to the swap curve and
examine the properties of swap spreads. Our results support their ﬁnding that both
default-risk and liquidity components are present in swap spreads. By modeling both
the swap and Treasury curves simultaneously, however, we are also able to address
the issue of how credit risk is priced in the market, which is the primary focus of
this paper. Another related paper is He (2000) who independently uses a multi-factor
aﬃne term structure framework similar to ours in modeling swap spreads. While He
does not estimate the parameters of his model, our empirical results provide support
f o rb o t hs w a ps p r e a dm o d e l i n gf r a m e w o r k s .G r i n b l a t t( 2 0 0 1 )m o d e l st h es w a ps p r e a d
1In a recent paper, Duﬃe (1996) studies the causes and eﬀects of special repo rates
in the Treasury repo market. See also Sundaresan (1994), Jordan and Jordan (1997),
Buraschi and Menini (2001), and Krishnamurthy (2001).
2as the annuitized value of an instantaneous convenience yield. If this convenience yield
is interpreted as the liquidity component o ft h es p r e a dp r o c e s s ,t h e no u rr e s u l t sc a n
also be viewed as providing support for the implications of his model. Other related
papers include Sun, Sundaresan, and Wang (1993) who study the extent to which
counterparty credit risk aﬀects market swap rates, and Collin-Dufresne and Solnik
(2001) who focus on the spread between Libor corporate rates and swap rates.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the frame-
work used to model the swap and Treasury term structures. Section 3 describes the
data. Section 4 discusses the maximum likelihood estimation of the model. Section
5 focuses on the implications of the results for the liquidity of Treasury securities.
Section 6 discusses the empirical results about the properties of swap spreads. Sec-
tion 7 presents the results about the pricing of default and liquidity risk. Section 8
summarizes the results and makes concluding remarks.
2. MODELING SWAP SPREADS
To understand how the market prices credit risk over time, we need a framework for
estimating expected returns implied by the swap and Treasury term structures. In
this section, we use the Duﬃe and Singleton (1997, 1999) credit modeling approach
as the underlying framework in which to analyze the behavior of swap spreads. In
particular, we jointly model the swap and Treasury term structures using a ﬁve-factor
aﬃne framework and estimate the parameters of the model by maximum likelihood.2
Recall that under standard no-arbitrage assumptions, the value D(t,T)o far i s k -











where r denotes the instantaneous riskless rate and the expectation is taken with
respect to the risk-neutral measure Q rather than the objective measure P.I n t h e
Duﬃe and Singleton (1997, 1999) framework, default is modeled as the realization of a
Poisson process with an intensity which may be time varying. Under some assumptions
about the nature of recovery in the event of default, they demonstrate that the value
of a risky zero-coupon bond C(t,T) can be expressed in the following form
2Other examples of aﬃne credit models include Duﬀee (1999, 2002), He (2000), Duﬃe,
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where λ is a credit-spread process.3 They also show that this credit-spread process may
be viewed as the product of the time-varying Poisson intensity and the recovery-rate
process. Furthermore, they argue that the credit-spread process could also include a
time-varying liquidity component which may be either positive or negative. In this
paper, we simply refer to λ as the credit-spread process, keeping in mind, however,
that λ may include both default-risk and liquidity components. Consequently, the term
credit risk is used in a general sense throughout this paper, reﬂecting that variation
in credit or swap spreads may be due to changes in either default risk or liquidity.
In applying this credit model to swaps, we are implicitly making two assump-
tions. First, we assume that there is no counterparty credit risk. This is consistent
with recent papers by Grinblatt (2001), Duﬃe and Singleton (1997), and He (2000)
that argue that the eﬀects of counterparty credit risk on market swap rates should
be negligible because of the standard marking-to-market or posting-of-collateral and
haircut requirements almost universally applied in swap markets.4 Second, we make
the relatively weak assumption that the credit risk inherent in the Libor rate (which
determines the swap rate) can be modeled as the credit risk of a single defaultable
entity. In actuality, the Libor rate is a composite of rates quoted by 16 banks and,
as such, need not represent the credit risk of any particular bank.5 In this sense, the
credit risk implicit in the swap curve can be viewed essentially as the average credit
risk of the most representative banks providing quotations for Eurodollar balances.6
3In the Duﬃe and Singleton (1999) model, the recovery rate is linked to the value
of the bond immediately prior to the default event. While this assumption has been
criticized, the fact that Libor is computed from a set of banks that may change over
time if some banks experience a deteriorati o ni nt h e i rc r e d i tr a t i n ga r g u e st h a tt h i s
a s s u m p t i o nm a yb em o r ed e f e n s i b l ew h e na p p l i e dt ot h es w a pc u r v e .
4Even in the absence of these requirements, the eﬀects of counterparty credit risk
for swaps between similar counterparties are very small relative to the size of the
swap spread. For example, see Cooper and Mello (1991), Sun, Sundaresan, and Wang
(1993), Bollier and Sorensen (1994), Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (1995), Duﬃe and Huang
(1996), and Minton (1997).
5The oﬃcial Libor rate is determined by eliminating the highest and lowest four bank
quotes and then averaging the remaining eight. Furthermore, the set of 16 banks whose
quotes are included in determining Libor may change over time. Thus, the credit risk
inherent in Libor may be “refreshed” periodically as low credit banks are dropped
from the sample and higher credit banks are added. The eﬀects of this “refreshing”
phenomenon on the diﬀerences between Libor rates and swap rates are discussed in
Colin-Dufresne and Solnik (2001).
6For discussions about the economic role that interest-rate swaps play in ﬁnancial mar-
4To model the discount bond prices D(t,T)a n dC(t,T), we next need to specify
the dynamics of r and λ. In doing this, we parallel the approach used by Duﬃe
and Kan (1996), Duﬃe and Singleton (1997), Duﬀee (1999), Dai and Singleton (2000,
2001), and others by working within a general aﬃne framework. In particular, we
assume that the dynamics of r and λ are driven by a vector X of ﬁve state variables,
X  =[ X1,X 2,X 3,X 4,X 5]. Following Dai and Singleton (2000), we assume that
r = δ0 + X1 + X2 + X3 + X4, (3)
where δ0 is a constant. Thus, the dynamics of the riskless term structure are driven
by the ﬁrst four state variables. This four-factor speciﬁcation of the riskless term
structure is consistent with recent evidence by Dai and Singleton (2001) and Duﬀee
(2002) about the number of signiﬁcant factors aﬀecting Treasury yields.7
In modeling the dynamics of the spread λ, we assume that
λ = δ1 + γr + X5, (4)
where δ1 and γ are constants which may be positive or negative. Note that this
speciﬁcation allows the spread λ to depend on the state variables driving the riskless
term structure in both direct and indirect ways. Speciﬁcally, λ depends directly on
the ﬁrst four state variables through the term γr in Eq. (4). Indirectly, however,
the spread λ may be correlated with the riskless term structure through correlations
between X5 and the other state variables.
The advantage of allowing for both a direct and an indirect relation between the
spread λ and the factors driving the riskless term structure is that it enables us to
examine in more depth the determinants of swap spreads. For example, our approach
allows us to examine whether the sw a ps p r e a di sa na r t i f a c to ft h ed i ﬀerence in the
tax treatment given to Treasury securities and Eurodollar deposits. Speciﬁcally, in-
terest from Treasury securities is exempt from state income taxation while interest
from Eurodollar deposits is not. Thus, if the spread λ were determined entirely by the
diﬀerential tax treatment, the parameter γ would represent the marginal state tax rate
kets, see Bicksler and Chen (1986), Turnbull (1987), Smith, Smithson, and Wakeman
(1988), Wall and Pringle (1989), Macfarlane, Ross, and Showers (1991), Sundare-
san (1991), Litzenberger (1992), Sun, Sundaresan, and Wang (1993), Brown, Harlow,
and Smith (1994), Minton (1997), Gupta and Subrahmanyam (2000), and Longstaﬀ,
Santa-Clara, and Schwartz (2001).
7Also see the empirical evidence in Litterman and Scheinkman (1991), Knez, Lit-
terman, and Scheinkman (1994), Piazzesi (1999), and Longstaﬀ,S a n t a - C l a r a ,a n d
Schwartz (2001) indicating the presence of at least three signiﬁcant factors in term
structure dynamics.
5of the marginal investor and might be on the order of .05 to .10. In contrast, struc-
tural models of default risk such as Merton (1974), Black and Cox (1976), Longstaﬀ
and Schwartz (1995) (also see Duﬀee (1998)), suggest that credit spreads should be
inversely related to the level of r, implying a negative sign for γ. These hypotheses
can be tested directly within our framework.
It is also important to note that this speciﬁcation implies that all ﬁve state vari-
ables impact the swap curve. Thus, this framework should be viewed as providing
a four-factor model of the Treasury curve and a ﬁve-factor model of the swap curve.
Because of the direct and indirect dependence of λ on the ﬁrst four state variables, this
framework should not be characterized as a single-factor model of the swap spread.
Note also that we assume that the value of λ is the same under both the objective
and risk-neutral measures. This assumption is standard and allows the parameters of
the model to be identiﬁed by maximum likelihood estimation.8
To close the model, we need to specify the dynamics of the ﬁve state variables
driving r and λ.F o l l o w i n g D u ﬃe and Kan (1996), Dai and Singleton (2000), and
others, we assume that under the risk-neutral measure, the state variable vector X
follows the general Gaussian process,
dX = −βXdt+ ΣdBQ, (5)
where β is a diagonal matrix, BQ is a vector of independent standard Brownian
motions, Σ is lower diagonal (with elements denoted by σij), and the covariance matrix
of the state variables ΣΣ  is of full rank and allows for general correlations among
the state variables. As shown by Dai and Singleton (2000), this is most general
Gaussian or A5(0) structure that can be deﬁned under the risk neutral measure. Since
λ is linear in the state variables, this Gaussian speciﬁcation implies that the spread
could potentially be negative. There are several reasons why this assumption may be
appropriate in this context. First, the process λ reﬂects the diﬀerential credit between
the swap and Treasury curves. While swap spreads have been uniformly positive in
the U.S., swap spreads have occasionally been negative in other currencies, and are
actually currently negative in Japan. Allowing λ to take on negative values enables the
model to be applied more generally. Secondly, λ also reﬂects potential diﬀerences in
liquidity. Again, while the liquidity of Treasury bonds has been very high historically,
the liquidity of the swaps market is growing rapidly while the total notional amount
of Treasury debt is not. Finally, Dai and Singleton (2001) argue that Gaussian models
are more successful in capturing the dynamic behavior of risk premia in the class of
aﬃne models.
8Dai and Singleton (2002) show that if this assumption is relaxed, then the parameters
of the model may not be identiﬁable from historical data and additional assumptions
about objective default probabilities need to be appended to implement the model.
6To study how the market compensates investors over time for bearing credit risk,
it is important to allow a fairly general speciﬁcation of the market prices of risk in
this aﬃne A0(5) framework. Accordingly, we assume that the dynamics of X under
t h eo b j e c t i v em e a s u r ea r eg i v e nb y
dX = −κ(X − θ)dt + ΣdBP, (6)
where κ is a diagonal matrix, θ is a vector, and BP is a vector of independent standard
Brownian motions. This speciﬁcation has the advantages of being both tractable and
allowing for general time varying market prices of risk for each of state variables.9
Given the risk-neutral dynamics of the state variables, closed-form solutions for
the prices of riskless zero-coupon bonds are given by
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and where L  =[ 1 ,1,1,1,0], and I is the identity matrix. Similarly, the prices of risky
zero-coupon bonds are given by
C(t,T)=e x p ( c(t)+d (t)X), (8)
9It is important to note, however, that even more general speciﬁcations for the market
prices of risk are possible. In principle, for example, the diagonal matrix κ could be
generalized to allow nonzero oﬀ-diagonal terms. Our speciﬁcation, however, already
requires the estimation of ten market price of risk parameters which approaches the
practical limits of our computational techniques. Adding more market price of risk
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and where M  =[ 1+γ,1+γ,1+γ,1+γ,1]. With these closed-form solutions, market
price of bonds can be inverted to solve directly for the latent state variables.
3. THE DATA
Given this framework for modeling the swap and Treasury term structures, the next
step is to estimate the parameters of the model using historical market data. In doing
this, we use one of the most extensive sets of U.S. swap data available, covering the
period from January 1988 to February 2002. This period includes most of the active
history of the U.S. swap market.
The swap data for the study consist of weekly (Friday) observations of the three-
month Libor rate and midmarket constant maturity swap (CMS) rates for maturities
of two, three, ﬁve, and ten years. These maturities represent the most liquid and
actively-traded maturities for swap contracts. All of these rates are based on end-
of-trading-day quotes available in New York to insure comparability of the data. In
estimating the parameters, we are careful to take into account daycount diﬀerences
among the rates since Libor rates are quoted on an actual/360 basis while swap rates
are semiannual bond equivalent yields. There are two sources for the swap data. The
primary source is the Bloomberg system which uses quotations from a number of swap
brokers. The data for Libor rates and for swap rates from the pre-1990 period are
provided by Salomon Smith Barney. As an independent check on the data, we also
compare the rates with quotes obtained from Datastream; the two sources of data are
g e n e r a l l yv e r yc o n s i s t e n t .
The Treasury data consists of weekly (Friday) observations of the constant ma-
turity Treasury (CMT) rates published by the Federal Reserve in the H-15 release
for maturities of two, three, ﬁve, and ten years. These rates are based on the yields
of on-the-run Treasury bonds of various maturities and reﬂects the Federal Reserve’s
estimate of what the par or coupon rate would be for these maturities. CMT rates are
widely used in ﬁnancial markets as indicators of Treasury rates for the most-actively-
traded-bond maturities. Since CMT rates are based heavily on the most-recently-
auctioned bonds for each maturity, CMT rates provide accurate estimates of yields
8for liquid on-the-run Treasury bonds. As such, these rates are more likely to reﬂect
actual market prices than quotations for less-liquid oﬀ-the-run Treasury bonds. Since
CMT rates are based on more-recently-issued bonds, however, they may incorporate
the eﬀects of any special repo ﬁnancing that may be associated with these bonds. The
possibility that these bonds may trade special in the repo market is taken into account
explicitly in the estimation of the model. The sources of this data are the same as
for swaps. Finally, data on three-month general collateral repo rates are provided by
Salomon Smith Barney, who also provided us with a set of term special repo rates for
June 30, 2000. Data for three-month Treasury bill rates are obtained from the Federal
Reserve.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the swap and Treasury data, as well as
the corresponding swap spreads. In this paper, we deﬁne the swap spread to be the
diﬀerence between the CMS rate and the corresponding-maturity CMT rate. Fig. 1
plots the two-year, three-year, ﬁve-year, and ten-year swap spreads over the sample
period. As shown, swap spreads average between 40 and 60 basis points during the
sample period, with standard deviations on the order of 20 to 25 basis points. The
standard deviations of weekly changes in swap spreads are only on the order of six
to eight basis points. Note, however, that there are weeks during which swap spreads
narrow or widen by as much as 45 basis points. In general, swap spreads are less
serially correlated than the interest rates. The ﬁrst diﬀerence of swap spreads, however,
displays signiﬁcantly more negative serial correlation. This implies that there is a
strong mean reverting component to swap spreads.
4. ESTIMATING THE TERM STRUCTURE MODEL
In this section, we describe the empirical approach used in estimating the term struc-
ture model and report the maximum likelihood parameter estimates. The empirical
approach closely parallels that of the recent papers by Duﬃe and Singleton (1997), Dai
and Singleton (2000), and Duﬀee (2002). This approach also draws on other papers in
the empirical term structure literature such as Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (1992), Chen
and Scott (1993), Pearson and Sun (1994), Duﬀee (1999), and many others.
In this ﬁve-factor model, the parameters of both the objective and risk-neutral
dynamics of the state variables need to be estimated. In addition, we need to solve
for the value of the state variable vector X for each of the 734 weeks in the sample
period. At each date, the information set consists of observations of four points along
the Treasury curve and ﬁve points along the swap curve. Speciﬁcally, we use the
CMT2, CMT3, CMT5 and CMT10 rates for the Treasury curve, and the three-month
Libor, CMS2, CMS3, CMS5, and CMS10 rates for the swap curve. Since the model
involves only ﬁve state variables, using nine observations at each date provides us with
signiﬁcant additional cross-sectional pricing information from which the parameters
of the risk-neutral dynamics can be more precisely identiﬁed.
9We focus ﬁrst on how the ﬁve values of the state variables are determined. Similar
to Chen and Scott (1993), Duﬃe and Singleton (1997), Dai and Singleton (2000),
Duﬀee (2002), and others, we solve for the value of X by assuming that speciﬁcr a t e s
are observed without error each week. In particular, we assume that the CMT2,
CMT3, and CMT10 rates, along with the three-month Libor and CMS10 rates, are
observed without error. These rates include the shortest and longest maturity rates
along both curves and are among the most-liquid maturities quoted, and hence, the
most likely to be observed with a minimum of error. Note that Libor is given simply










where a is the actual number of days during the next three months. Since CMT and
CMS rates represent par rates, they are also easily expressed as explicit functions of
the values of riskless and risky zero coupon bonds,
CMTT =2
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1 − D(t,t + T)
2T





1 − C(t,t + T)
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i=1 C(t,t + i/2)

. (11)
Given a parameter vector, we can then invert the closed-form expressions for these
ﬁve rates to solve for the corresponding values of the state variables using a standard
nonlinear optimization technique. While this process is straightforward, it is compu-
tationally very intensive since the inversion must be repeated for every trial value of
the parameter vector utilized by the numerical search algorithm in maximizing the
likelihood function.
To deﬁne the log likelihood function, let R1,t be the vector of the ﬁve rates
a s s u m e dt ob eo b s e r v e dw i t h o u te r r o ra tt i m et,a n dl e tR2,t be the vector of the
remaining four observed rates. Using the closed-form solution, we can solve for Xt
from R1t
Xt = h(R1,t,Θ), (12)





(Xt+∆t − θ − K(Xt − θ)) Ω−1(Xt+∆t − θ − K(Xt − θ)) + ln | Ω |
i
, (13)
10where K is a diagonal matrix with i-th diagonal term e−κii∆t,a n dΩ is a matrix with





Let  t+∆t denote the vector of diﬀerences between the observed value of R2,t+∆t and
the value implied by the model.10 Assuming that the   terms are independently dis-
tributed normal variables with zero means and variances η2
i , the log likelihood function






   t+∆t −
1
2
ln | Σ  |, (14)
where Σ  is a diagonal matrix with diagonal elements η2
i, i =1 ,...,4.
Since Xt+∆t and  t+∆t are assumed to be independent, the log likelihood function for
[Xt+∆t, t+∆t]  is simply the sum of Eqs. (13) and (14).
The ﬁnal step in specifying the likelihood function consists of changing variables from
the vector [Xt, t]  of state variables and error terms to the vector [R1,t,R 2,t]  of rates
actually observed. It is easily shown that the determinant of the Jacobian matrix is
given by | Jt |=|
∂h(R1,t)
∂RI
1,t | . Summing over all observations gives the log likelihood







(Xt+∆t − θ − K(Xt − θ)) Ω−1(Xt+∆t − θ − K(Xt − θ))
+l n | Ω | +   
t+∆t Σ−1
   t+∆t +l n | Σ  | +2l n| Jt |
=
(15)
Given this speciﬁcation, likelihood function depends explicitly on 37 parameters.
From this log likelihood function, we now solve directly for the maximum like-
lihood parameter estimates using a standard nonlinear optimization algorithm. In
doing this, we initiate the algorithm at a wide variety of starting values to insure that
the global maximum is achieved. Furthermore, we check the results using an alter-
native genetic algorithm which has the property of being less susceptible to ﬁnding
local minima. These diagnostic checks conﬁrm that the algorithm converges to the
10We assume that the   terms are independent. In actuality, the   terms could be
correlated. As is shown later, however, the variances of the   terms are very small
and the assumption of independence is unlikely to have much eﬀect on the estimated
model parameters.
11global maximum and that the parameter estimates are robust to perturbations of the
starting values.
Table 2 reports the maximum likelihood parameter estimates and their asymp-
totic standard errors. As shown, there are clear diﬀerences between the objective and
risk-neutral parameters. These diﬀerences have major implications for the dynamics
of the key variables r and λ which we consider in the next two sections. The diﬀer-
ences themselves reﬂect the market prices of risk for the state variables and also have
important implications for the expected returns from bearing credit and liquidity risk.
We note that the β and κ parameters are all estimated to be positive; the estimation
procedure does not constrain these parameters to be positive. One key result that
emerges from the maximum likelihood estimation is that the ﬁve-factor model ﬁts the
data well, at least in its cross-sectional dimension. For example, the standard devia-
tions of the pricing errors for the CMS2, CMS3, CMS5, and CMT5 rates (given by η1,
η2, η3,a n dη4, respectively) are 12.2, 9.0, 6.4, and 6.0 basis points respectively. These
errors are fairly small and are on the same order of magnitude as those reported in
Dai and Singleton (1997) and Duﬀee (2002). Note, however, that we are estimating
both the Treasury and swap curves simultaneously. In addition, with the exception
of a few of the parameters of Σ, all of the parameters of the model are statistically
signiﬁc a n tb a s e do nt h e i ra s y m p t otic standard errors.
Table 3 reports the correlation matrix for the state variables implied by the max-
imum likelihood estimates of the parameters deﬁning Σ. As shown, a number of the
correlations are negative. As pointed out by Duﬀee (2002) and Dai and Singleton
(2002), it is not possible to capture the empirically-observed humped term structure
of interest rate volatility within an aﬃne model unless there are negative correlations
among some of the factors. Thus, our results are consistent with these empirical
properties.
5. THE IMPLIED FINANCING RATE
The instantaneous riskless rate r plays a central role in many continuous-time term
structure models. In addition to being the shortest-maturity rate, r can also be
viewed as the cost of borrowing on short-term riskless loans such as those fully secured
by riskless Treasury bond collateral. Traditionally, the cost of riskless borrowing is
equated to the Treasury-bill rate since this is the rate at which the U.S. Treasury
can borrow short-term funds. Among practitioners, however, the Treasury-bill rate is
generally viewed as a noisy measure of the true riskless rate (see also recent academic
work by Duﬀee (1996)). The reason for this is the widespread belief that the extreme
liquidity of Treasury bills makes them worth slightly more than the present value of
their cash ﬂows, and hence, that Treasury-bill rates can represent downward biased
estimates of the true cost of riskless borrowing. Some recent papers (for example,
Longstaﬀ (2000)) suggest considering general collateral Treasury repo rates as an
12alternative measure of the riskless rate. The rationale for this measure is that repo
loans that are overcollateralized by default-free Treasury bonds are essentially riskless
short-term loans. Because repo loans are ﬁnancial contracts rather than securities,
however, they may be less aﬀected by liquidity events such as short squeezes (although
there are many examples of illiquid ﬁnancial contracts).
A useful feature of our approach is that we can solve for the value of r endoge-
nously and then contrast it with market rates. This allows us to explore directly the
question of whether the implied value of r more closely resembles Treasury-bill rates
or repo rates. In this model, the implied rate r represents the cost of carrying a posi-
tion in the longer-term Treasury bonds deﬁning the CMT rates. If these longer-term
bonds do not have special liquidity value, then r should represent the riskless interest
rate for the market. On the other hand, if longer-term Treasury bonds have liquidity
value, then the estimated value of r takes on the interpretation of a special repo rate
in the sense of Duﬃe (1996). Speciﬁcally, since r is implied from the cross section of
CMT rates (and from the swap rates), r represents the average or typical short-term
special repo rate for the on-the-run bonds in the sample.11 In this case, r may then be
less than the true riskless rate. To reﬂect the unique role that r p l a y si nt h i sm o d e l ,
we designate r the implied ﬁnancing rate.
To make estimates of the implied ﬁnancing rate comparable with the three-month
general collateral repo and Treasury-bill rates in the sample, we redeﬁne the implied
ﬁn a n c i n gr a t es l i g h t l yt ob et h ey i e l di m p l i ed by a three-month riskless zero coupon
bond.12 Using the maximum likelihood parameter values, the values of the state vari-
ables are implied from the data as described previously. Given the values of the state
variables, the value of the riskless bond is obtained directly from the closed-form ex-
pression in Eq. (7). Table 4 reports summary statistics for the three-month general
collateral repo rates, implied ﬁnancing rates, and Treasury-bill rates along with the
spreads between these rates. Fig. 2 graphs the diﬀerence between the implied ﬁnanc-
ing rate and the Treasury-bill rate, and the diﬀerence between the repo rate and the
implied ﬁnancing rate.
As shown, the implied ﬁnancing rate generally lies between the general collateral
repo rate and the Treasury-bill rate. On average, the implied ﬁnancing rate is 8.0
basis points below the repo rate, but 27.6 basis points above the Treasury-bill rate.
The median implied ﬁnancing rate is 2.9 basis points below the median repo rate, but
11We are using a slightly broader interpretation of the special repo rate since special
repo rates are typically associated with a speciﬁc Treasury bond. The advantage of
this approach, however, is that since these implied special repo rates are based on the
dynamics of r,t h e yr e ﬂect not only the current liquidity of the bonds, but also the
possibility of future increases in their liquidity. Thus, this interpretation lends itself
well to comparisons with term special repo rates.
12See Chapman, Long, and Pearson (1999) for a discussion of the eﬀects of using
three-month rates as a proxy for instantaneous rates.
1327.5 basis points above the median Treasury-bill rate. These results are consistent
with the view that the general collateral repo rate may be closer to the actual riskless
rate than the Treasury-bill rate.
The spread between the implied ﬁnancing rate and the Treasury-bill rate can
be interpreted as a measure of the relative liquidity of Treasury bills and on-the-run
Treasury bonds. As shown in Fig. 2, this spread is typically positive, suggesting that
Treasury bills tended to be more liquid than Treasury bonds during much of the sample
period. During the 1990-93 period, however, the liquidity of Treasury bonds and bills
appears to converge. After the hedge fund crisis of 1998, the implied ﬁnancing rate
actually dips below the Treasury-bill rate, which suggests that longer-term on-the-run
Treasury bonds may have become more liquid that Treasury bills. This could possibly
be related to the fact that the U.S. Treasury no longer auctions one-year Treasury
bills on a regular basis.
Note that our estimates of this liquidity spread are consistent with those estimated
by Amihud and Mendelson (1991) and Kamara (1994) from the diﬀerences between
the yields on oﬀ-the-run Treasury notes and Treasury bills. For example, Amihud
and Mendelson ﬁnd that the spread between oﬀ-the-run Treasury notes and T-bills
averages 42.8 basis points. Kamara reports an average diﬀerence between Treasury
note and bill yields of 34 basis points. Since we use on-the-run bonds while Amihud
and Mendelson and Kamara use oﬀ-the-run bonds in computing the liquidity pre-
mium in Treasury bills, one would expect our estimate to be less than theirs by the
amount of the liquidity diﬀerence between on-the-run and oﬀ-the-run Treasury bonds.
Subtracting our estimate of 27.6 basis points from their estimates implies a liquid-
ity diﬀerence between oﬀ-the-run and on-the-run bonds of 6.4 to 15.2 basis points.
While we acknowledge that that comparing spreads from diﬀerent studies (calculated
using diﬀerent data and time periods) is far from a rigorous analysis, it is intriguing
that these estimates are very consistent with the evidence from term repo rates to be
presented later in this section.
If one is willing to equate the general collateral repo rate with the riskless rate,
then the diﬀerence between the repo rate and the implied ﬁnancing rate could be given
a simple interpretation of the average implied specialness of the on-the-run Treasury
b o n d su s e dt oc o m p u t eC M Tr a t e s .F i g .2s h o w st h a tt h i si m p l i e ds p e c i a l n e s sv a r i e s
signiﬁcantly over time. During the ﬁrst part of the sample period, the implied special-
ness is as high as 40 basis points, suggesting that the prices of Treasury bonds have a
large liquidity component. During the 1994-1998 period, the implied specialness of the
Treasury bonds essentially disappears and the implied ﬁnancing rate approximates the
general collateral repo rate. After the hedge-fund crisis of 1998, however, the implied
specialness of the bonds increases dramatically, reaching a high of more than 75 basis
points near the end of the sample period.
To provide a simple “back-of-the-envelope” estimate of the size of the liquidity or
specialness component in the prices of on-the-run Treasury bonds, we do the following.
14First, we denote the implied specialness (general collateral repo rate - the implied
ﬁnancing rate) by St, and assume that St follows a standard Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
process. Estimating the parameters of this process by maximum likelihood gives the
following dynamic speciﬁcation for St,
dS =5 .91812 ( .000842 − S ) dt + .00799 dB, (16)
where B is a standard Brownian motion. For a zero-coupon Treasury bond with
maturity T, the present value beneﬁt or specialness premium from being able to borrow
at the special repo rate rather than the general repo rate equals










under the assumptions that B is independent of the other Brownian motions in the
term structure model and that the market price of risk for S is zero. Evaluating
this expectation (using the Vasicek (1977) interest rate model) allows us to obtain
estimates of the size of the liquidity or specialness premia in the prices of the Treasury
bonds. Summary statistics for these premia are reported in Table 5.
As shown, the value of liquidity or specialness premium in the prices of on-the-
run Treasury bonds can be substantial. For the two-year Treasury note, the premium
ranges from about four cents to 14 cents during the sample period per $100 notional
amount, which translates roughly to a two to seven basis point eﬀect on the yield.
Thus, there is signiﬁcant time variation in the value of the premium. For the ten-
year Treasury note, the premium was typically in excess of 42 cents per $100 notional
or roughly six basis points in terms of yield to maturity. During the latter portion
o ft h es a m p l ep e r i o d ,t h ep r e m i u mw a sa sh i g ha s5 7c e n t s ,o re i g h tb a s i sp o i n t so f
yield. These results indicate that the value of liquidity can represent an important
time-varying component of the value of a Treasury bond.
As an additional diagnostic for the estimated specialness premia, we also use a
set of term special repo rates provided to us by Salomon Smith Barney. This data set
reports the longest term special repo rates for individual Treasury bonds available in
the market as of June 30, 2000, along with the general collateral repo rate for the same
term. The implied premium per $100 value of the bond is given by simply taking the
diﬀerence between the general collateral and special repo rates and multiplying by the
term of the repo measured in years. This makes clear that the value of the specialness
premium can be viewed as the interest savings an investor who ﬁnances his purchase
of the bond would receive by being able to ﬁnance at the special repo rate rather than
the general collateral repo rate. Table 6 reports the special and general collateral rates
f o rt h eb o n d sw i t hm a t u r i t i e so ft e ny e a r so rl e s sa l o n gw i t ht h ei m p l i e ds p e c i a l n e s s
15premia. The two-year, ﬁve-year, and ten-year on-the-run bonds are denoted by an
asterisk.
As shown in Table 6, a number of Treasury bonds trade special in the repo mar-
ket. For many of these bonds, the diﬀerence between the term special and general
collateral repo rates is small, and the implied specialness premium is likewise small.
For the on-the-run bonds, however, the value of the specialness premia is substantial.
In particular, the specialness premia for the two-year, ﬁve-year, and ten-year on-the-
run bonds given in Table 6 are 8.0 cents, 50.5 cents, and 64.3 cents respectively.13 This
agrees well with the average implied specialness premia reported in Table 5. Further-
more, as discussed earlier, these estimates of the liquidity premia in on-the-run special
bonds are also in broad agreement with the estimated liquidity premia in Treasury
bills relative to on-the-run bonds shown in Table 5 and the average liquidity premia
for Treasury bills relative to oﬀ-the-run bonds reported by Amihud and Mendelson
(1991) and Kamara (1994) (see also Boudoukh and Whitelaw (1993), Longstaﬀ (1995),
Jordan and Jordan (1997), Buraschi and Menini (2001), and Krishnamurthy (2001)).
This provides additional evidence that the model is capturing key features of the
Treasury and swap term structures.14
6. THE SPREAD PROCESS
The spread process λ plays a particularly important role in the Duﬃe and Singleton
(1997) credit modeling framework. Recall that in this framework, the spread λ may
consist of both default-risk and liquidity components. Since the Libor rate is ﬁtted
exactly in the maximum likelihood estimation, the implied spread λ can be thought of
as the diﬀerence between the Libor rate and the implied ﬁnancing rate. From Eqs. (3)
and (4), λ is a function of all ﬁve state variables. Table 2 reports that the maximum
likelihood estimate of the parameter γ is -.07126, which implies that there is a strong
negative relation between the level of λ and the level of the riskless rate r.T h i s
relation is consistent with the negative relation between rates and spreads implied by
a number of fundamental models of credit spreads including Merton (1974), Black
and Cox (1976), and Longstaﬀ a n dS c h w a r t z( 1 9 9 5 )a n dd o c u m e n t e db yD u ﬀee (1998)
and others. As discussed earlier, an additional inﬂuence on the value of γ could be
taxation, since Treasury bills are not taxable for state income tax purposes while Libor
cash ﬂows are. That γ is negative, however, argues against the hypothesis that swap
spreads are primarily an artifact of diﬀerential taxation.
13There is no on-the-run three-year bond on June 30, 2000 because the Treasury had
previously stopped auctioning three-year bonds.
14Conversations with market practitioners indicate that there are occasional periods
during which the specialness premia for some on-the-run Treasury issues implied by
market term special repo rates are on the order of twice those shown in Table 6.
16Fig. 3 graphs the time series of λ for the sample period. As illustrated, the spread
λ varies signiﬁcantly over time. For example, at the beginning of the sample period,
the spread is on the order of 80 basis points. During the latter 1990s, however, the
spread decreases signiﬁcantly and becomes nearly zero. The period during which the
spread is nearly zero coincides with the period in which there is little apparent liquidity
component in Treasury bonds as measured by the implied specialness estimate. This
suggests that this period may represent a time when the market viewed both the
liquidity of the swap market as identical to that of Treasury bonds and the probability
that banks quoting Libor rates could default as essentially zero. Although the model
allows the spread to become negative, relatively few observations are actually (slightly)
negative.
In theory, the spread λ could include both default-risk and liquidity components.
A l t h o u g ht h e r ei sn os i m p l ew a yt od e c o m p o s et h es p r e a di n t ot h e s et w oc o m p o n e n t s ,
it is interesting to compare the spread with several variables which may be correlated
with these components. For example, the spread between the general repo rate and the
implied ﬁnancing rate can be viewed as a proxy for Treasury liquidity. Similarly, the
spread between the Libor rate and the general repo rate should contain information
about the default risk of banks quoting Libor rates. To explore this, Fig. 4 presents
scatterdiagrams of the credit spread against these two variables. As illustrated, the
correlation between the spread and the proxy for liquidity is much higher than the
correlation between the spread and the proxy for default risk. In particular, the
correlation of the spread with the default-risk proxy is .126 while the correlation of
the spread with the liquidity proxy is .830. Furthermore, the correlation of weekly
changes in the spread with changes in in the default-risk proxy is -.115 while the
correlation of weekly changes in the spread with changes in the liquidity proxy is .558.
Taken together, these results are supportive of the view that much of the variation in
spreads is driven by changes in liquidity.
7. THE MARKET PRICE OF CREDIT RISK
A major objective of this paper is to examine how the market prices the credit risk in
interest rate swaps. To this end, we focus on the premia that are incorporated into
the expected returns of bonds implied by the estimated term structure model. These
premia are given directly from the diﬀerences between the objective and risk-neutral
parameters of the model.
To provide some perspective for these results, however, it is useful to also examine
the implications of the model for the term premia in Treasury bond prices. Applying
Ito’s Lemma to the closed-form expression for the value of a riskless zero-coupon bond
given in Eq. (7) results in the following expression for its instantaneous expected
return
17r + b (t)((β − κ)Xt + κθ)). (18)
The ﬁrst term in this expression is the riskles sr a t ea n dt h es u mo ft h er e m a i n i n gt e r m s
is the instantaneous term premium for the bond. This term premium is time varying
since it depends explicitly on the state variables. To solve for the unconditional term
premium, we take the expectation over the objective measure of the state variables
which gives b (t)βθ.
Now applying Ito’s Lemma to the closed-form expression for the price of the
risky zero-coupon bond given in Eq. (8) leads to the following expression for the
instantaneous expected return
r + d (t)((β − κ)Xt + κθ)). (19)
The ﬁrst term in this expression is again the instantaneous risky rate. The sum of
the remaining terms can be interpreted as the combined term premium and credit
p r e m i u m . T os o l v ef o rt h ec r e d i tp r e m i um separately, we simply take the diﬀerence
between the expected return of a risky zero-coupon bond and the expected return on
a riskless zero-coupon bond with the same maturity. As before, the credit premium
is time varying through its dependence on the state variables. Taking the expectation
with respect to the objective measure for the state variables and subtracting the
expression for the unconditional term premium gives (d(t) − b(t)) βθ.
Focusing ﬁrst on the unconditional premia, Table 7 reports the unconditional
term premia for riskless zero-coupon bonds with maturities ranging from one to ten
years. Table 7 also reports the unconditional credit premia for risky zero-coupon
bonds with the same maturities. These unconditional premia are also graphed in
Fig. 5. As shown, the mean term premia are positive and monotonically increasing
functions of time to maturity. Mean term premia range from about 97 basis points for
a one-year horizon to about 321 basis points for a ten-year horizon. These estimates
of unconditional term premia are similar to those reported by Fama (1984), Fama and
Bliss (1987), and others.
Table 7 and Fig. 5 also show that unconditional credit premia are positive and
increasing functions of maturity. The mean credit premium for a one-year horizon is
only 0.1 basis points. Thus, there is very little compensation on average for bearing
short-term credit risk. At longer horizons, however, the mean credit premium is much
larger. For example, the mean credit premium for a ten-year horizon is 45 basis
points. The convex shape of the unconditional credit premium curve indicates that
investors require sharply higher credit premia as the maturity of the bond increases.
This pattern contrasts with that observed for the unconditional term premia.
To give some sense of the time variation in term and credit premia, Fig. 6 graphs
these premia for a ten-year maturity zero-coupon bond. As illustrated, the term
18premium displays a signiﬁcant amount of variation. The term premium is usually
positive, but has generally tended downward throughout the sample period and is
signiﬁcantly negative at the end of the sample period.
The time series of the credit premium displays a number of surprising features.
Recall that the average credit premium for a ten-year horizon is about 45 basis points.
Fig. 6 shows that the conditional credit premium varies signiﬁcantly over time and is
often large in absolute terms. Most surprisingly, the credit premium is negative for
nearly one half of the sample period. The credit premium ﬁrst becomes negative in
approximately 1992 and remains generally negative until the fall of 1998. This is about
when the Russian government defaulted on a large issue of its ruble-denominated debt.
Despite the variation, however, the credit premium appears to be less volatile than the
term premium. Although not shown, a very similar pattern holds for credit premia in
bonds with shorter maturities.
8. CONCLUSION
This paper examines how the market prices the credit and liquidity risk inherent in
interest rate swaps relative to Treasury bonds. A number of key results emerge from
this analysis. For example, we ﬁnd that on-the-run Treasury bonds have a signiﬁcant
liquidity component to their value. This liquidity component can be as much as 0.57
percent of the notional amount of a ten-year Treasury bond. The value of this liquidity
component varies signiﬁcantly over time. In addition, we ﬁnd that the market prices
the credit risk of swaps. The market price of credit risk, however, varies over time and
was occasionally negative for during the 1990s.
There are a number of possible extensions to this research. For example, the
approach of solving for the implied ﬁnancing rate could be applied to the term struc-
tures for corporate bond issuers and then used to identify the liquidity components of
their spreads.15 One major puzzle is why the credit premia implicit in swap spreads
were negative during the 1990s, and only became signiﬁcantly positive again after
the hedge-fund crisis of 1998. Certainly, these results are diﬃcult to reconcile with a
view of the market in which investors are aware of the historical variability in swap
spreads and where expected returns compensate investors for their exposure to risk.
A possible resolution of this puzzle may be that most of the credit risk reﬂected in
swap spreads may actually represent the liquidity risk of Treasury bonds. From this
perspective, Treasury bonds may be subject to a unique risk which does not aﬀect
pure contracts such as swaps, and may be priced accordingly in the market. Clearly,
further research is necessary to resolve this issue.
15Huang and Huang (2000) focus on the estimation of the liquidity components in
corporate bond prices.
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Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Model Parameters. This table reports the maximum likeli-
hood estimates of the parameters of the ﬁve-factor term structure model along with their asymptotic standard
errors. The asymptotic standard errors are based on the inverse of the information matrix computed from
the Hessian matrix for the log likelihood function.





































η4 .00060 .00011Table 3
Correlation Matrix for the State Variables. This table reports the instantaneous correlation
matrix for the state variable vector implied by the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters
in Table 2.
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5
X1 1.0000
X2 -.0579 1.0000
X3 .0169 -.0602 1.000
X4 -.3505 .0209 -.1972 1.0000
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